The global stock market crash this past Monday over fear of a forthcoming US recession has rendered materially visible the long economic stagnation across the large market economies. Those that feel content with the “not yet” moment of a strong AI financial bubble see it as an interphase of ongoing transformations on the domain of artificial intelligence. The interphase hypothesis, however, prefers to ignore that the expansion of AI will only plunge even deeper the condition of stagnation and the end of human labor. 

In this scenario, it has been interesting to see one segment of the stock market that has stood the test of the global crash; mainly, the defense giant Lockheed Martin, whose stocks S&P stood firmly at 55% and its profit has seen about 21% growth compared to a year ago and expecting revenues as high as 71 billions at the closing of this year. In fact, according to Frank St John, chief operating officer at Lookhead Martin, “the company will not slow its production rate. St John said it would “probably take three or four quarters to work our way through the backlog of jets that need to be delivered”. The active war zones in Eastern Europe have only intensified the production growth of the military economy. 

From a historical perspective there is nothing new here, and it is “business as usual”. In fact, the great German war economic theorist of the Weimar Republic, Adolf Caspary, who also authored the book Wirtschaftsstrategie Und Kriegsführung (1932), entitled as piece in the Esquire, March of 1944, entitled “War is a Business, as Usual”, where he claimed that historically “though the expenditure of war have become larger, the risk is smaller, for manpower, industrial resources and wealth decide the war – if they are mobilized”. Of course, Caspary’s historical conditions were one of ‘total mobilization’, as famously theorized by Jünger; whereas ours is one of demobilization, stagnation, and polycrises. The partial mobilization of military industries is, at best, a symptom of the epochal demobilization and paralysis. 

There is also something like an inversion of the causal relationship between wealth and hostilities: if for Caspary in the 1930s it was the effective management of wealth what could lead a nation to win a war, in our times it is the production of multiple wars and catastrophes what need to be organized in order to maintain the still too illusory, and thus compensatory, state of productive economic growth. This is also why military giants like Lockheed Martin or RTX Corporation are federal state sponsored conglomerates that nourish the otherwise decomposition of modern state form. What is unusual in the “business as usual” of war management and the economy in our days is that neither wars are won, nor is a stable productive economy ever achieved.