Youth and Old Age. by Gerardo Muñoz

In a moment of the Conversations with Eckerman, Goethe tells his interlocutor that there is always a particular arrogance to youth, and goes on to add that “indeed, everyone believes in his youth that the world really began with him, and that all merely exists for his sake” [1]. In fact, the illusions clustered around the ideal of “Youth” promotes repeated recommencement, as if world historical progress would depend on the fictional origin of a segment of life in the promising rise of the youth. It does not come to surprise that in our times, youth is elevated and cherished, while social relations undergo an accelerated path of constant rejuvenation and infantilization in clear hostilities with past generations and old age. In fact, in recent m attempts at providing the correct diagnosis of the crisis of West once and for all – and by doing that promoting the final and ultimate cures – we have seen political theorists insisting on gerontocracy as the root of economic inequity , as well as a necessary coming of internal civil war or class struggle between generations. These arguments, along with the new technologies that delegate the sensible dimension of the event of language, are obviously working on the denigrating premise well understood by Goethe; mainly, that starting from scratch must commence from the glorious defense of the youth. In its radically voluntarist assumptions, this defense of the youth adopts the futurist aspiration of the old romantic revolutionaries, for whom all that smelled of the past was understood to be already within enemy lines.

It does not take too much to understand that the defense of the youth as a beacon of the “new” – as the origin of generations that will “bring about a new world” – is very much in the spirit of an epoch that eternally dwells in the present without any relation with the past. In this sense, the metonymic attack on “gerontocracy” (that puts the blame on older generations by taking specific figures of governing political elites) is only a ruse that works in tandem with the ongoing techno-economic anxieties about the necessity at all costs to overcome stagnation and the end of growth. Old Age can easily be just disposed and discarded in our societies, because what is “old” brings about the possibility of a human destiny that can contemplate itself as a form of life that ceases to be functional to the regime of production. This is why, as Goethe suspected, the beginning is not to be found in Youth but only at the end of life, where character is gathered in destiny in a sort of appropriation of a life’s temporality.

This is why in his extraordinary essay on artists and old age, Gottfried Benn could write that “Face to face with the Western world, I did my work; I lived as if the day had come — my own day. I was the man that I shall be. And so at the end I take my stand on all the church fathers, all those ancient men with centuries behind them: non eonfundar in detention — I too shall not be condemned eternally.” [2]. Or when Elias Canetti in a gloss in The secret heart of the clock (1985) writes: “Finally I have become what I have always been, an authentic old man”. Canetti does not mean that he finally reached the end of his life and thus he is ready to die; rather, he hints at the fact that in coming of old age, he is able to discern the authentic figure of what constitutes the bond between your life and the world, something like his true harmony where he can be at peace. It is only in old age, once our eyes are almost closed and seemingly unattentive and astray, that we can truly “see” the inner figure of life. This is what Plato understood so well in a moment of The Laws: “Yes, when we’re young, we’re pretty blind to them [ideas]; old age is the best time to see them clearly” [3].

And of course, to see is to contemplate the movement of thought as it is taking place, beyond the partitions and separations imposed by “generational breaks” and their embedded hostilities. But what is this figure of thought that is finally contemplated and discerned with such clarity? Cowper Powys will also insist on the realization of proportion that is only grasped in Old Age: “Well, then, where in heaven’s name lies the grand advantage of old age? To be near extinction, near what may easily prove everlasting extinction? What advantage is that? I will answer you in one world and that word is proportion. We get for the first time in life when we grow a sense of proportion” [4]. Old Age is the beginning of a sense of proportion not because a “new” historical epoch can recommence from its ‘origin’, but rather because in its nearness to death, staged in the time of irreversible stagnation, it can contemplate what it has loved and overcome in order to be of a certain way.

Nowhere is this more beautifully thematized as in Titian’s “The Three Ages of Man” (1512), where Old Age seated on the grass of an uninhabited meadow medidates not such on his personal death and immortality, but on the proportion of love as symbolized by the two skulls that he holds in each hand. If old age is the keeper of proportionality, this is due to the fact that it can finally contemplate the events that have been absorbed in life. The idea of proportion is nothing else but the invisible weavers of a destiny that transports us to the secret love of youth, which in Titian’s picture is represented by a single lover that holds two flutes at once. A clear parallelism that reveals ultimately the belated sense of proportion: the supreme eros is ultimately can put in tonal communication youth and old age, carrying the embodied memory of the two, whether these are the two skulls or the flutes once enjoyed at each other’s company.

It is only in old age when proximity becomes proportional to what has transformed the texture of life, because all predicates naturally correspond to truth of being. In the summa of the emblematic tradition, as Panofsky once observed, old age is represented as a “Wise Council” that conquers haste; it is founded on industrious nocturnal study, and it must be directed towards Prudence” [5]. It goes without saying that Old Age is wise not because of rigorous knowledge or expertise, but because it can now realize the authentic study of its own figure beyond any heroism. The vigorous, and at times overwhelming and presentist depreciation of Old Age, facing the social question of the “aging population” endures the mutilation between the ‘ages of men’, instead of listening to the music that animates the living. Now human experience is left with the impoverished chatter of private and arbitrary necessities among distinct and fragmented generations that no longer have anything to communicate or remember to each other.

Notes

1. Johann Peter Eckermann. Conversations of Goethe (Capo Press, 1998), 333.

2. Gottfried Benn. “Artists and Old Age: An Essay on the Creative Personality”, The Atlantic, March 1957: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1957/03/artists-and-old-age-an-essay-on-the-creative-personality/642213/

3. Plato. The Laws, ed. T. J. Saunders (Penguin Books, 2004), 715e, 128.

4. John Cowper Powys. The Art of Growing Old (Jonathan Cape, 1944), 206.

5. Erwin Panofsky. Problems in Titian: Mostly Iconographic (New York University Press, 1969), 107.

Cowper Powys on catastrophic world-events. by Gerardo Muñoz

In the short epilogue “Historical Background to the year of grace A.D. 499” to his novel Porius (1951), John Cowper Powys lays out a remarkable prophetic evaluation of a world fallen into a permanent catastrophic condition. Powys’ return to the sixth century in his novel departed from the fascinating fact that during the mid-fifth century there appears to be “an absolute blank” page about the history and culture of its people. And the only historical record proves that the central element was the Arthur’s commanding political dominion over the English territories. In these blank pages of history there are no tormented voices or traces of everyday existence, but the most absolute compacted pressure of barbarism and grandiose “crafty personal diplomacy” oriented by political rule. For Powys, this is the movement of abstract historical force that raises up the mirror of civilization and barbarism in the West.

However , this mirror is completely alien to any notion of happiness, imagination, and sensibility between the surviving human species. A world war had just concluded and atomic menace was the strange tune of daily life. But, in contrast to the triumphalist and historical narrative of postwar diplomatic theaters, Cowper Powys directs his vision (like Hölderlin and Pound before him with Greece and the Latin Mediterranean poets) to a prehistoric strata where language and sensation still had a chance against the civilizational collapse of the West. Against both civilization and barbarism, Powys prepares himself to drift away from something major, perhaps more even more catastrophic, which he never names directly in the Porious prologue, although he can unravel its essence in the last paragraph:

“As we contemplate the historic background to the autumn of the last year of the fifth century, it is impossible not to think of the background of human life from which we watch the first half of the twentieth century dissolve into the second half. As the old gods were departing then, so the old gods are departing now. And as the future was dark with the terrifying possibilities of human disaster then, so, today, are we confronted by the possibility of catastrophic world events compared with which those that Arthur and his Counsellor and his Horsemen contented against seem, as the Hebrew poet said, a “very little thing” [1]”.

It is thanks to the genius of Cowper Powys that the coming of catastrophe is understood not as another phase in world-history, but rather, as the opening of endless catastrophic world-events. Even before Martin Heidegger would define the essence of cybernetics as the consummation of the calculation of world events, Powys had already suspected that a stealth rationality towards calculation of events was the catastrophe that crossed the very line of the polarity of barbarism and civilization. The catastrophe of world-event consummation was hinged upon the total convergence of machine and humanity that would liquidate the free relation of the living in the world. As Powys had written in The Meaning of Culture (1930) decades prior: “Money and machines between them dominate the civilized world. Between them, the power of money and the power of the machine have distracted the minds of our western nations from those eternal aspects of life and nature, the contemplation of which engenders all noble and subtle thoughts” [2].

The ascent of atomic existence and the absolute dependency on administrative infrastructure to contain the world, will validate Powys’ astute observation about the ongoing catastrophe at a moment when its development was barely beginning to gain traction. And against futile political fictions, Powys was aware that in a civilization of collapse, political chatter becomes the only legible foul discourse: “Among other aspects of our destiny in this modern regime, the rumor of politics makes itself only too audible” [3]. The seriousness of this rumor has only deepened almost a century after.

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Notes 

1. John Cowper Powys. “Historical Background to the year of grace A.D. 499”, Porius (1952), xi.

2. John Cowper Powys. The Meaning of Culture (Jonathan Cape, 1932), 150. 

3. Ibid., 302-303.