Proem and language. by Gerardo Muñoz

In Book IV of the Laws (722d), Plato introduces the notion of the proem, at times also translated as preamble, as a necessary feature for any community with active legislation. But, what is ultimately a proem? The notion applied to the political world is actually quite unusual. As Robin Waterfield notes in his recent political biography, before Plato there was no other thinker concerned with proems or preambles in order for laws to retain their harmony and thus serve for the “inculcation of virtue in citizens as their purpose” [1]. Obviously, the proem points to the problem of language and the event of speech in the polity. Preceding legislation and any enacted laws, there has to be an attunement of language, which already in Plato’s epoch meant that the world governed by music and attunement with the gods was a thing of the past. The disenchanted inception governing the polis is already a secondary language that only comes after the end of the age of Chronus. But we will do a disservice to the ancient notion of proem if we just project our understanding of the relationship between principles and norms of legal adjudication to ancient antiquity.

This means that we should not conflate the notion of proem to that of principle (ius) from which we can exert retroactive justification of legal reasoning; the proem is a region of language that precedes any laws that are enacted and applied by a legislative polity. And because it precedes juridical form, the proem is infrajuridical, yet it is fundamentally constitutive of it. It is also not divorced from rhetoric, given that Plato is writing and thinking at a moment of the closure of the polis as a homogeneous space of relations among things and services. So, in order to understand the function of the proem, one must avoid projecting the modern form of popular legitimacy and public opinion, as Ernest Barker does explicitly in his classical work The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (1959), where he writes that: “The laws must be preceded by proems or prefaces, enunciating the principle on which they are based…by showing that they are the logical result of principles which he accepts. In these prefaces, one finds as it were a Greek counterpart of the function which Parliament and the Press play today, in enabling a minister or a party to explain or excuse a policy of a legislative scheme” [2].

In its emphatic allusion to the “press”, it is clear that the notion of proem amounts to an appendix or rhetorical elucidation to public opinion that seeks to win over a majority within competing factions over public policy. On the contrary, for Plato the proem is understood as the “taking place in the voice of language that aids the coming performance” in preparation for the homecoming of just legislation (722d). What is telling here is precisely that the proem ceases to be a justification for a legal rule or norm, it is rather what accompanies the very genesis of the nomoi as something that cannot be entirely excluded from language, but rather that it presupposes the possibility of an enduring voice or tonality of those that participate in a community. This is, of course, a sharp contrast to the modern articulation between legal authority and language; and, it almost seems instructive to recall how in Thomas Hobbes, whose definition of authority as auctoritas non veritas facit legem presupposes the neutralization of “reasons”, language becomes mute due to a potential stasis or ‘civil war of words’, as he says somewhere in De Cive.

This is why modern political thought can only think through reasons as directed toward the permissibility or rejection of social actions, but fails to come to terms with the inclusive reasons of language as conditions for persuasion and naming. In other words, modern politics can situate and command directives for actions in the public, but it cannot longer name or think of the absence of a word that is still could be said. Leo Strauss was up to something when he openly claims in his course  that “From here on until the end of the Laws a city is being founded in speech” [3]. The region of common speech is the proem, and this means that there is no kallipolis – and this is especially true, as Plato already explained to us in Book III, after the confusion of musical styles of a “theatrocracy” (701a) – but only autonomous positions of self-affirmation of charismatic leadership that results in an inexorable sacralization of mortals and idolatry fixed by representation. As Victor Goldschmidt noted in his classic text on ancient theologia, the distinction of poetic forms in the Laws is a way to rigorously separate the hymns and prayers for gods from those songs of mortal deeds, so that language refrains from participating in the regime of force and measurement in the polis subsumed by the homogeneity for every-thing that appears to be “other than” some other thing [4]. In the very notable analysis of Felipe Martinez Marzoa:

“Let us reiterate something that could also be considered already stated. There is not the slightest possibility of interpreting anything that Plato or any other Greek says about the polis as being in terms of the “State”. The polis is, in any case, a specific community, and therefore a specific event and set of specific bonds. From its specific character in contrast to the “barbarian” community—that is, from all that we have described as the genesis of an internal space —follows (as we have already explained in various ways) the breaking of boundaries, and its dissolution into a principle of the unlimited (and therefore also the liquidation of the polis itself). There is no longer community, nor event, nor bonds; nothing begins or ends at any point. Only when this is no longer a result, but an obvious fact at the starting point, will the phenomenon of the “State” have emerged.” [5].

One can imagine that Plato faced the phenomena of an emergent reality in which language or ‘common speech, under the conditions of enacted theatrocracy, can only appear as the force of opinion and auxiliary to the justification of the social normativity of the laws enacted by social facts. By introducing the proemial dimension of language, the Laws favors the priority of language over politics and the social body against and beyond the closure of rhetorical logistics and manipulation as embedded in the new autonomy of public language. The proem does not mean that all things have to be addressed in a debate as the modern political thinkers like to defend in the assembly form; rather, the accent is placed on the dimension that is always lacking in the sayable; that is, in that which because it is “unsayable really means unpresayable; it coincides with the way discourses give themselves, with the fact that humans do not stop speaking to one another [6]. A just nomoi must not represent speakers – the One or many, big or small – but allow speech to flourish in its own declension and unexpected puncture.

This is so alien and strange to modern ears that from the internal point of view of legality it becomes impossible to think of unsayable language as the condition for just laws to be posited beyond argumentation or norms for actions. If anything, what the proem brings to bear is that the exception to law is not that paralysis that leads to executive power or anarchy, but rather a cultivation of language as a vehicle that is able to establish proportional mediation with the sensible world. In this way, by means of this proportionality, Platon inscribed the archaic notion of nomos as melody as the mythical trace that haunts and limits the unidirectional movement of the polis. If ultimately law becomes too tyrannical it is not because it results in legal motorization or the technification of moral principles; it bends towards tyranny once it loses its improper and unsayable relation to language, which is what is lodged in the idea of the proem; although not as an explanatory prologue or “preamble” to what has been written, but as a hole at the very center of the nomos.

Notes

1. Robin Waterfield. Plato of Athens: A Life in Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2023), 190.

2. Ernest Barker. The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (Dover, 1959), 189.

3. Leo Strauss. The Argument and the Action of Plato’s Laws (University of Chicago Press, 1998), 54.

4. Victor Goldschmidt. “Théologia”, Revue des Études Grecques, 1950 , 63-294-298, 40.

5. Felipe Martínez Marzoa. Muestras de Platón (Abada Editores, 2007), 92-93.

6. Giorgio Agamben. “Sullo scrivere proemi”, in Che cos’è la filosofia? (Quodlibet, 2016), 131.

Una negación de la legitimidad desde Hölderlin. por Gerardo Muñoz

Decíamos anteriormente que el problema de la vuelta al origen de la legitimidad es una regresión fútil, pues queda destinada a reproducir las mismas condiciones que la llevaron a su ruina. En la medida en que la modernidad es la génesis de su proceso de legitimación, también podemos dentificar allí su momento abismal o clivaje fundamental en el despliegue de su historicidad. En realidad, este es el problema que identifica Hölderlin al interior de los debates del idealismo alemán, aunque no nos interesa aquí esa discusión dentro de los límites de esa tradición filosófica en esta exploración. En todo caso, lo que nos concierna es lo que pudiéramos llamar el gesto de negación de la primacía de la legitimidad por parte de Hölderlin. Leyendo Hölderlin y la lógica hegeliana (1995), Felipe Martínez Marzoa concluye su libro con una disgregación que nos ayuda a elucidar este problema de manera nítida. Escribe Martínez Marzoa, a propósito de la vuelta de Hölderlin a Grecia:

“….Grecia es aquello que solo tiene lugar perdiéndose y cuyo en-cada-caso-hacerse-ya-perdido es Hesperia o la modernidad o “nosotros”; de algunas de las expresiones que esto tiene dentro de la propia obra de Hölderlin nos hemos ocupado ya en otros lugares; aquí, en el contexto de la relación de Hölderlin con la lógica hegeliana, tiene sentido que también a propósito de la cuestión “legitimidad del enunciado” hayamos recordado cómo la modernidad es el ponerse como principio aquel en-cada-caso-ya-haberse-perdido inherente a Grecia.” [1]. 

La difícil tematización “griega” de Hölderlin – que concierna la traducción fragmentaria e imposible de Píndaro, luego de atravesar la ruina del poeta trágico ante lo aórgico del drama de Empédocles – es otra manera de negar la legitimidad en cuento a principio elaborado como del enunciado del sujeto. En efecto, en el segundo capítulo “Reflexión y sujeto” Martínez Marzoa define el sentido moderno en función de la “legitimidad del enunciado”, que se establece a partir de su auto-consistencia con las condiciones de predicación, y en tanto tal como hypokeímenon; esto es, como sujeto con “capacidad de significar independiente de todo análisis de estructuras lógicas” que alcanza condición de “algo de algo” (ti katá tinos) [2]. Esta es la legitimidad que Hölderlin pone en cuestión (y también su diferencia infra-mínima con todo hegelianismo), y que hace posible un viraje que Martínez Marzoa llama “mediatez estricta”. Esta mediatez en su determinación pindárica es una sustracción de toda sujeción y mediación para así designar algo que no cesa de llevarse a cabo. 

El nomoi griego insustituible es suelo sin suelo que, en virtud de ser insustituible, abre la ruina de toda representación y no se abona en la capacidad de mímesis. De aquí se deriva el sentido de que Grecia es la posibilidad de sustracción, pero también de nominación de lo que pertenece irreductible al nosotros. Esa medites no es negación, sino indiferencia ante una región abismal e inconceptual. Esta dimensión intersticial – del “entre” o en la “apertura de la luz” – lleva al suelo de la legitimidad a su límite, porque ya no está condicionada hiperbólicamente por un sujeto, sino por una poética entreverada por la distancia. Aquí podemos ver también la máxima proximidad de Hölderlin con la revolución francesa, pero también su mayor salto fuera de ella, puesto que “los derechos universales del Hombre” sería un enunciado de legitimidad ilegitima, caída, incapaz de recoger la “mediatez estricta” del abismo griego como nomōs sin restitución. En otras palabras, se trataría de una legitimidad acotada y reducido al sujeto político como abstracción.

Desde luego, podemos decir que la única legitimidad posible para Hölderlin solo era posible tematizando la relación con la mediatez de las cosas en su irreductibilidad. Y solo esto alcanzaba a constituir un “saber superior que se concretará entre la persistencia del espíritu entre la cosa y su ser” [3]. Esta persistencia que asiste al abismo es, desde luego, “persistencia en la escisión” en la cosa, pero también marca de una relación disyuntiva entre Grecia y la génesis de lo moderno. Esta persistencia en la escisión – por usar el término de Blay – es de la luz negra del no-saber que hace apertura del acontecimiento en el umbral de toda adecuación del enunciado y de la determinación genérica del concepto. Píndaro en todo caso supone ese movimiento entreverado que le devuelve a la realidad la dimensión acontecimental, no-sujetada, en el desborde con cada una de las casas para preparar otra realidad. Grecia era entonces opacidad inmedible; en efecto, la condición anómica del principio de legitimidad, porque ya siempre la invalida.

.

Notas 

1. Felipe Martínez. Marzoa. Hölderlin y la lógica hegeliana (La balsa de la medusa, 1995). 

2. Ibíd., 24.

2. Eulalia Blay. Píndaro desde Hölderlin (La Oficina, 2018). 183-184.