Arcadia after the age of poets. by Gerardo Muñoz

Monia Ferrando’s archeological reconstruction of Arcadia as a “political paradigm” that retreats from the nomos of force and usurpation has as its fundamental condition poetry and the voice of the poets. Given the tripartite nomoi of Arcadia (as law of the heart, song, and meadows), which exceeds the autonomy of the polis in Athens, poetic voice functions as the mediation for the effective transmission of the mythopoetic figure that would guarantee another relation, a non-productive and authentic proximity with the world. Throughout the book, whenever Ferrando wants to take a distance from the polis as derivative from the polis she goes to the poets and poetry. Consider for instance, this moment (all the translations are mine from the Spanish edition) in the last chapter on the political paradigm of Virgil: “Poetry, then, is called upon, from its own painful present, to venture like a new Orpheus, but as a memore veggente [a memorious seer], into the darkness of the past, to give new form to love without being content with its mere image. To traverse the stratification of human experience that has shaped the world in order to reshape, in turn, a love reduced to a bloodless and deceptive phantom” [1]. The ‘pre-political’ site of Arcadia is in the poetic voice, whose fundamental task is to transform the ideal of triumph and victory to that of erotic enchantment and fascination that refuses the autonomization of the erotic image [2]. 

If one considers the totality of Il Regno Errante it is not all too difficult to discern that the transmission and ambivalent origin of irruption in the tradition – which Ferrando thinks with Overbeck’s urgeschichte  – is only possible through both a poetization of politics, and the substitution of the hēgemon by the poet when thinking about the afterlife of Arcadia in the genesis of the West, in the very passage from Antiquity to the modern epoch. In this way, poetics is not subsumed to political practice, guided by the classical figure of the ‘Dichter als fuhrer’ described by Max Kommerell, but a state of the via contemplativa in its distancing with the world. In a very elucidating moment Ferrando thematizes this as follows: “Eros is not a political practice in which thought is neatly concealed, but a poetics that culminates in the disinterested contemplation of beauty, in pure theoria. Here, poetry will be philosophical, and philosophy, poetic, without any distinction” [3]. But it is also here that poetry is acting as the supreme activity that can retrieve and connect existence in the world, which is the proper to the classical antiquity, which solicits the question: could this still hold for the philosophical predicament of the poem in modernity? Can the poet stand and mediate to the prophecy at the moment of the decline of the logos, positing the dichtung as an operative substitute? It seems to me that this presents us with an unavoidable difficulty about the transmission of the memory of Arcadia. And we should do well to articulate it.

In her recent biography of Paul Celan, Anna Arno mentions in passing and without no theoretical pretensions, that the young Jewish poet, still under the influence of his mentor Alfred Sperber, wrote a poem that while taking place in the meadows of Arcadia, there is a loose arrow that hinders and hunts the possibility and and shadow of death. The last verses of the poem titled “The arrow of Artemis” introduce something like an oblique and unfathomable shadow in the landscape of Arcadia, which Arno describes in this way:  

“The ‘born again’ poet dedicated “The arrow of Artemis” to his mentor. Celan rendered the Arcadian landscape, but in the final stanza he expressed his fear: “How should he who, above sky-blue pebbles…not ponder that Artemis’ arrow, still lurks in the forest and in the end will strike him?”. Introducing a sense of peril, the poem struck up a polemic: mythical lands provided no shelter against the shockwaves of historic barbarism. Celan was declaring a new path, unlike what Sperber could have chosen for him”. [4].

While on the surface there is a superficial way of reading this commentary in the manner of the typical proximity-distance of the “anxiety of influence”, I want to read this moment as emblematic and hyperbolic of the condition of the crisis of the age of the poets in modernity where the transmission of the Arcadian bliss is impossible in the wake of historical barbarism, which also shatters the structure of poematicity as it runs through the intricate work of Celan. How do we understand Celan’s ‘new path’ that seems absolutely heterogeneous to the divinization of the musical voice required to disclose the Arcadian myth? Perhaps modern poetry, and modern poets at large, cannot initiate the restitution of Arcadia because they can only recognize its own autonomy in a postmythic world after the fleeing of the gods and the absence of God (as verbalized in Hölderlin’s fragment on Oedipus).

This is what Giorgio Agamben has seen in his text on San Juan de la Cruz when discussing poetry to mystical theology:  “Indeed, San Juan’s mystical theology still presupposes the existence of a positive theology and of a Holy Scripture, from which it derives its own legitimacy and guarantee. Modern poetry, instead, does not recognize any other holy scripture but itself. For this reason, modern poetry—insofar as it is its own, sole guarantor—has been fatally led to question its own limits and its own adequacy and to search in its own incessant, ironic sacrificial self-negation for the only valid guarantee of its own authenticity” [5]. And more recently, this thesis has also been validated explicitly in Il corpo della (2026), where he recalls that all major poetic gestures of Western poetry in the twentieth century – from Pound’s Cantos to Eliot’s The Wasteland, from Mandelstam’s Fourth Prose to Celan’s own destructive poetry of the German language  – only manages to preserve the ruins and fragments of the tradition. The poet can only register those fragments, but he is incapable of building another world in the accumulated site of its ruins. 

In its possibility of bearing witness in language, experience might open up the trace of the voice in the non-place of death as the sole destiny of between beings, as Carchia suggests in his early essay on Celan’s “The Meridian” [6]. But poetry transfigured in this way entails that the figure of Arcadia can only be taken as the possibility that emerges from the event of language at the border of nihilism and madness. As emblems of this poetic experience without revelation, both Hölderlin’s madness and Celan’s suicide are perhaps instances of this ‘seeking’ in the shadow of Arcadia’s disinterested via contemplativa of beauty, where the nocturnal black that casts a shadow into the clear and sunny landscape of the memory of Arcadia. This shadow does not eclipse the myth of Arcadia; far from it; in its theistic passage disclosed by light of the eros daimon, the voice seems to be prolonged and eternal at the very end of the experience of modern poetry.

Notes 

1. Monica Ferrando. El reino errante: la Arcadia como paradigma político (Adriana Hidalgo, 2024), 638.

2. Ibid., 595. 

3. Ibid., 538. 

4. Anna Arno, Paul Celan: A Life (Harvard Press, 2026), 60-61.

5. Giorgio Agamben. “La notte oscura di Juan de la Cruz”, in Poesie: Juan de la Cruz (Einaudi, 1974), xii.

6. Gianni Carchia. “Il Meridiano di Celan”, Rivista di Estetica, XVIII, May-August 1973, 196. 

Ethics and chorâ. by Gerardo Muñoz


A few years ago, in a book I edited on the thought of Giorgio Agamben, I tried to suggest that his work was both an archeology of politics in the wake of the closure of metaphysics and a reopening of the problem of existence. Now it seems to me that this formulation did not go deep enough, insofar as I remained silent about about existence was inscribed into a problematic field of reflection. Agamben has continued writing many other books in recent years, and in reading them I have come to think that the question of existence is intimately tied to the problem of “ethics”, which continues to be underdeveloped in his philosophical writings, but then again probably all ethics is always underwritten, oblique, and fundamentally lacking an essence. As Agamben states in La comunità che viene (1990): “….the point of departure of any discourse on ethics is that there is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no biopolitical destiny…This is the only reason why something like an ethics can exist, because it is clear that if humans were or had to be this or that substance…no ethical experience would be possible – there would be only tasks to be done” [1]. 

It is obvious that ethics is unequal to morality, and here Agamben implicitly (later it will become also explicit in his opuscule L’avventura) is taking a distance from the Goethean conflation of ethos into a substrate of nature in the Aristotelian tradition [2]. But in the 1990 essay, Agamben is still considering and grappling with “ethics” from a vantage point that I would call a high-level of generality that can only connect to the conceptual exploration of potentiality and potentiality with an unequal valence, still searching for its ground as it were. In more recent books, it has become evident that Agamben’s thinking on ethics achieves a new precision. It does not mean that it modifies or alters his conviction of the untamable and unprogrammatic potentiality of ethics against morality and nihilism, but it does put it in the specific light the terrain of language. I am thinking of this moment in Filosofia prima Filosofia ultima (2023), where he writes the following:

“What corresponds to is not a limit dimension of signification [“that which is said”], not even in the mystical form of a negation or a dark night, but an experience absolutely heterogeneous to that: not a logic but an ethics; not a logos but an ethics or a form of life. In other words, ethics is first and foremost the experience that reveals itself when we dwell in a fully nonintentional language. Far from being mute and ineffable, it is the speech we wrong when language frees itself from its suppositional pretension and address itself not as an object of a metalanguage but as the rhythm and scansion of a doing, a poesis” [3] 

In no other book has a view on ethics come forth with the same force and eloquence. Although, clearly, the passage is drenched in negative conditions («not mystical, not a logic, not a logos»), the thinker also advances towards a par construens orientation that allows him to push for a different route from the relationship of ethics and language arrested in two important paradigms of Western thought: that of the mystical ineffable experience, and that of Wittgestein’s suggestion in his 1929 lecture that the ethical question runs into the “boundaries of language” in its attempt to go beyond the world [4].

The mystical experience of the “dark night” – and which Agamben seems to be recapitulating here after early essay on this very question in an edition of San Juan De la Cruz’s poetry translated in Italian – is also, in the words of Gustav Landauer’s Skepsis und Mystik (1903), the immaterial symbol of what cannot be discussed any further [5]. And in the early essay on De la Cruz’s mystic poetry, Agamben positioned himself against the elevation of dichtung as an autonomous sphere of the language’s modern wreckage into discourse and rhetoric. In both conceptions, Agamben seems to suggest, the negative lack in language seems to hold back the event of language that is nothing more than the “sayable”. And this sayable is the non-articulated, and thus in suspended judgement before the world (although not beyond it) in the opening of the voice securing its own appearance without remainder or negative threshold of substantial lack.

There is something to be said about this ex-position in Agamben’s types of the ethical life in recent books; mainly, Pulcinella, Pinocchio, Hölderlin, and the formless peasantry of the Rabelaisian world. Is not common to all them, precisely, an experience of the taking place of language that, far from being divorced from the world, is able to makes its own chorā within the world? As we read in Il corpo della lingua 2024): “… is because there is no world, but always and constantly leaping worlds within worlds that sink into each other in a star-crossed blazon, which is the same sensitivity of God as a living and thinking being” [6].

The refinement around the question of ethics also illuminates the moment in L’uso dei corpi (2014) where Agamben, following French linguist Michel Bréal, attempts to secure the modal status of the “ethos” as a creative non-relation (and non-naturalist) of being, which is not only a matter of “suspension of a work of end”, but more positively, a dwelling in non-intententional use of language [7]. And is not this, precisely, the language of Persuasion (Peitho) in which the human touches the divine, an eternal life of speech that relates, in an angular manner, to Karl Barth’s suum cuique’ solace between life and death, happiness and pain? It is an open and intriguing question. The pure taking place of every thing – as God is, in fact, in all things – is the positive ethics of the chorā in which nothing is presupposed, and yet its ek-tasis never perturbes what, in fact, takes place in language.

Notes 

1. Giorgio Agamben. La comunità che viene (Einaudi, 1990). 

2. Giorgio Agamben. L’avventura (nottetempo, 2015), 11-12. 

3. Giorgio Agamben. Filosofia prima filosofia ultima (Einaudi, 2023), 74.

4. Ludwig Wittgestein. Lecture on Ethics (Wiley Blackwell, 2014), 119. 

5. Giorgio Agamben. “La ‘notte oscura’ di San Juan de la Cruz”, in Poesie (Einaudi, 1974), v-xiii.

6. Giorgio Agamben. Il corpo della lingua (Einaudi, 2024), 59.

7. Giorgio Agamben. L’uso dei corpi (Neri Pozza, 2014), 314.