energy

Lexis alia. On Miguel Valderrama’s Guerra y Democracia: Retrato, Stasis, Anonimia (2025). by Gerardo Muñoz

How to think through the stasis as a figure of thought in an epoch of transition and decline? This is the task of the historian – perhaps also of the philosopher and the critic – at the threshold, according to Miguel Valderrama in his book Guerra y Democracia: Retrato, Stasis, Anonimia (Palinodia, 2025), where stasis is extended beyond its categorial inscription in the grammar of political thought in order to capture its oscillatory movement. Dispersion is a word at the heart of Valderrama’s scene of writing; a scattering of sense that radicalizes the enterprise of the historian’s task that cannot remain alien to the problem of language. In fact, it is at the conjunction where Valderrama wants to situate the problem of stasis. As he writes early on in the book: “Pasión en la dispersión, sí, sí con esta frase se nombre en secreto lo que en la errancia del vocablo stasis evoca una escena traumatizante, una herida, una punzada la escenificación de un acontecimiento y el orificio de su representación, la memoria de una stasis y de la anonimia que le es más propia, impropia” (Valderrama 15). 

For Valderrama the Greek term – which holds on to definitions of civil war but also conflict and internal stabilization – now welcomed in theoretical discussions, comes to name the errancy and wound of the endurance of war in the modern political project of representation and legibility. As a thinker of the local scene (and its counter-scenes), Valderrama perceives that in recent years the Chilean contemporary critical discussion, especially in the wake of the Chilean revolt of October 2019, has introduced the pulsating grammar of stasis to think this fissure in representation. Valderrama cites the essays by Rodrigo Karmy, and Alejandra Castillo, Juan Pablo Arancibia, Willy Thayer; but also publications like Escrituras Americanas and the now defunct Revista Disenseo, and the novelist Nona Fernández (Valderrama 31). Obviously, the list is not exhaustive. In the Chilean contemporary scene, stasis is removed from its hellenistic origins, in order to name the unmediated irruption of images, inscriptions, and languages as fragments in the interior of history (Valderrama 50). In post-dictatorship Chile these fragments gravitate around the impossible image of La Monada bombed in 1973, which is juxtaposed to the anonymous images of the revolt in Santiago in October 2019, where some are more monumental than others. 

One of the novelties in Valderrama’s Guerra y Democracia (2025) is precisely the insistence to think the problem of stasis as radially bound to the regime of visibility and legibility that organize the artifact of political representation. In fact, and following the canonical studies of the Leviathan’s frontispiece and its relation to modern optics, we know that modern political representation has relied consistently on material technologies where representation and the homogeneity of the social body coincide (Valderrama 79). From Thomas Hobbes at the birth of political liberalism to Carl Schmitt’s political theology in Weimar, the visual artefact has been the infrastructure in the making of political authority and the unity of civil society. The repressed containment of stasis at the heart of the modern liberal state is granted only if the regime of public legibility has been constructed. In this sense, all modern politics is necessarily heliotropic, revolving around the sun of sovereignty that will later transform into the electric and atomic form of energy reserves.

By the same token, following Valderrama, we can then say that what stasis names is precisely the breakdown of the helitropic movement in an epoch of absolute exposure and blinding transparency. More than a century ago, in 1913 Malevich could speak of the “Victory over the Sun”, but this can only make sense if such victory can allow for a regime of nocturnal seeing and generic anonymity, which is always on the ‘other side’ of political dominium (be it techno-capitalism or communal administration) where all identifications fails, because there is no longer a common body or a name as energy reserve for social organization. It is because of this rupture that there cannot be a stasis within the social, but also against the closure of the spatial arraignment of the Social understood as the site that requires energy (production) in order to produce a certain degree of comprehensive idealization. Of course, Valderrama is not oblivious to this, as he writes in one of his most programmatic definition of the stasis: 

“La revuelta, la stasis, se define contra esta dieta y contra este régimen de luz. Al bertillonismo que define los límites y la lógica del espacio público, la revuelta opone la multiplicación de máscaras, la suspensión del retrato, la proliferación de lo anónimo. El régimen diurno del aparecer opone la noche, las sombras y el humo de los enfrentamientos de cuerpos liberados del rostro y del retrato, de la ficha policial. La revuelta pone en movimiento una anonimia, un juego de máscaras que desata anónimos, pseudónimos, alonomios, sobrenombres, para nombres, antenombres….La anónimo guarda un secreto en la imagen, lo guarda como lagrima y caída de la imagen” (Valderrama 109-110). 

But is it just a festive game of defacement and creative destruction that would resemble the spirit of carnival festivities, in which masks evoke, in an exceptional time of inversion, the supernatural powers and the dead as studied by Karl Meuli? Is not the carnival a compensatory act of the logistics of expenditure and realignment for any community of social exchange? If true, then the notion of stasis would need to break from the polarity of social identification and instance of mask, in the same way that already in the classical period the stasis emerged as a zone of indistinction between domestic and public spaces, an unbreachable black hole between the oikos and the polis that is well beyond the exception (Valderrama 119). In other words, stasis needs to be rethought as something other than an interruption in temporality, which is still the negative duration that feeds negatively into the course of temporal order of social domination and its ‘economy of violence’. Valderrama reminds that for the poet Armando Uribe, this economy of violence names the very engine of historical development. And poets tend to be better than political analysts at imagining other worlds.

Towards the end of Guerra y Democracia: Retrato, Stasis, Anonimia (2025), Valderrama briefly glosses Armando Uribe’s 2000 lecture “El fantasma Pinochet” in order to introduce not only the problem of violence, but also language; a language that he calls uncanny, “une inquietante étrangeté” (Valderrama 120). These words are glossing Uribe who is also commenting a speech by former President Eduardo Frei, but that can also be used to thematize the central problem that Guerra y Democracia introduces in its scene: how to traverse a destitution of language if stasis is the capacity to traverse the moribund language that metaphoric and cataphoric politics speaks, without any possibility of saying anything at all? As an initial promise of the book, Valderrama had called for ‘another lexis’ (“otra lexis”) against narrativity and the hallucination of language towards a ‘language as such’, which is the language of naming approaching the coasts of physis. It is tempting to say that the revolt only appears liberating when understood as a problem of inventing and making space for this other language that ceases to be a metaphor of this world.

Aladdin’s lamp and world domination. by Gerardo Muñoz

In his 1982 novel Aladdin’s Problem (1982), Ernst Jünger defined planetary domination through the actualization of the trope of Aladdin’s lamp. Whenever a symbol of this sort is used, we know that it always carries weight of ambivalence more than that of synthesis. The mythic lamp is a trope for magic and enduring power; of countering visibility and invisibility, but it is also made from a material that has been extracted from the Earth. In other words, raw materials are manipulated as a reservoir of energy that dispense the world of forms. In the most succinct moment of the novel, Jünger writes: “Aladdin’s lamp was made of pewter or copper, perhaps merely clay. The lamp guaranteed domination as far as the frontiers of the traveled world – from China to Mauritania. Aladdin preferred the life of a minor despot. Our lamp is made of uranium. It establishes the same problem: power streaming towards us titanically” [1]. Aladdin’s lamp is no longer a tool deployed by governments and armies, it is rather the autonomous commanding force that opens to human domination and technological catastrophe that generates calculable objectivity in the world. 

In his conversations with Julien Hervier, Jünger stated that the “problem of Aladdin” is not a political problem, but rather one that involves the administration of energy and intelligence that is already beyond our hands, because it has been set loose by ongoing compulsion necessary to meet the indexes of production and transference of technology [2]. Of course, energy defined the broad design of modernity as the necessary condition to amplify historical forms and mediations (and deform, since it was always dialectic) of worldly events and relations. One should only be reminded that in the beginning of the 1920s three major texts by European thinkers – I am thinking of Pavel Florensky, Carl Schmitt, and Aby Warburg – saw the necessity to allude to the settled hegemony of electricity as the defining feature of the dominion of the world. 

As Warburg understood it prophetically in his lecture on the serpent ritual of the Hopi Indians: “But myths and symbols, in attempting to establish spiritual bonds between man and the outside world, create space of devotion and scope for reason which are destroyed by the instantaneous electrical contact – unless a disciplined humanity reintroduce the impediment of conscience” [3]. And it goes without saying that this “instantaneous electrical contact” has become so thoroughly engrained in human existence, that it is now clear that life on Earth, as advanced by the latest phase of Artificial Intelligence (AI), is no longer point to the destruction of space but of the total disruption of electricity and energy that exceeds any sensible contact. Electricity as the paradigm of artificial mediation can only liberate the spiritualization of ongoing decline. 

It is no historical accident that empires and nations have always been driven by the accumulation of energy, although at its historical exhaustion, there is no longer a veneer of development and production between energy and empire, but only a unified empire of energy in a lamp that quenches and overruns itself towards extinction. This means that what defines the darkness of our times is neither disorientation nor political violence (although there is much of that too), but the blinding darkness of a translucent expropriation of the world of the living and the dead. It is through this assumption that Jünger makes the last business of the epoch of Aladdin – extractive energy as domination of objects and objecthood between worlds – as a large necropolis called Terrestra, financed by a banker named Jersson, where there is no longer any need for the liturgy or cults proper to myths, but naked exchange between gold and the material corpse that suppresses, via technological titanism, any possible relations to the irreducible. It remains to be thought whether the moment when the lamp goes off in the drained excess of its energy will also lead to the end of this world.

.

.

Notes 

1. Ernst Jünger. Aladdin’s Problem (Marsilio Publishers, 1992), 118. 

2. Julien Hervier. Conversaciones con Ernst Jünger (Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1990), 100.

3. Aby Warburg. “A Lecture on Serpent Ritual”, Journal of Warburg Institute, V.2, April 1939, 292.

The world has been posthegemonic. by Gerardo Muñoz

In a recent text published at Verso Blog, entitled “The Coming Post-Hegemonic World”, Michael Hardt and Sandro Mezzadra make a case for a “turn to a post-hegemonic model” that will challenge the consensus of global in the coming era. In many ways, this era is already here with its diverse and multifaceted (in terms of intensities, forces, and leverages) of protracted and bizarre nationalisms, which as Jamie Merchant has teased out brilliantly, amount to desperate attempts to offer a belated response to the decline of growth as one more stage for containing rampant processes of accumulation via state capacities. For Hardt & Mezzadra, this “posthegemonic world to come” is characterized by a global spatial reconfiguration of capital – accommodating the logistics of regional spaces of influences and exchange across the planet – and on the other, an increasingly “domestic sphere of authoritarian rule” promoted by new accelerated initiatives at generating social homogeneity in the wake of rushing fragmentation hand in hand with a war regime that has utterly scrapped ideals about “strategic autonomy” in order to trumpet an arm race (nuclear weapons included), as it is currently unfolding in Europe. 

One can claim that this posthegemonic world is one that firmly assumes the consequences of two interdependent vectors that imploded within the project of political modernity: the end of  economic growth (thus validating the law of the fall of profit outlined in Capital V.III), and the liquidation of the principle of legitimacy that for two centuries accommodated the legislative sources of the state authority in democratic constituent power. For Hardt & Mezzadra posthegemony means global fragmentation, authoritarianism, and spatial remaking; however, one should also say that it means, the opening towards stagnation, the collapse of political unity of the state, and most recently the total discredit of the foolish leftist hypothesis that promoted a “rainbow social equivalent coalitions” to push for compensatory, and in every instance insufficient and moribound, populist resurgences elevated through the combustion of ethereal but effective rhetoric (in fact, my argument in a new short book, La fisura posthegemónica, is that the push for political hegemony of the last decades only cosigned forms of consensual totalization at the expense of the production of subalternization and social death).  

Even taken as a descriptive and normative condition of the current state of Western politics, the posthegemonic situation lays bare the reciprocal impasse of the claim of its opposition: in other words, one should also put to rest social mobilization that characterized the politics of High Modernity, since ultimately movements (and total mobilization as an apparatus of social energy transfer) presupposes that “every social structure, that it can receive what form required the needs of the political adventure…total mobilization signifies nothing other that the effort to reduce the social substance to a kind of plastic”, as Gérard Granel once defined it. Hence when Hardt & Mezzadra claim that the “effective rebellion must be rooted in social movements envisioning a life beyond the rule of capital”, they are inadvertently refusing to come to terms with the factical posthegemonic reality that they are describing, which is no longer driven by expansive economic growth, but rather by stagnation, and inoperativity at planetary scale that is maintained through the a global veneer of production into regimes of competitive accumulation (of territory, contractual debt, fiscal regulation, executive taxation or tariffs, and increasing arbitrary monetary regulations in the global system) for marginal profitability, as Paul Mattick argues in his recent The Return of Inflation (2023). 

This means that there is no outlook towards ‘social mobilization’ that does not serve the subjective productivity of real subsumption, since its ultimate goal is to anaxate social energy into the force of (un)productive labor. This form of dilatant mobilization can only serve the master of illusionary hegemony, and thus promote functional and unwarranted servitude everywhere. Indeed, only a reprobate can be immune to the moralist or the realist conditions of hegemony. If push comes to shove, the posthegemonic factical world of stagnation and political fragmentation already here proves that the ongoing irruption of non-movements are irreducible to the modern movement’s energy; and that life never fully coincides with political claim to rule and legitimacy, even less so in the becoming-world of Production. 

Ultimately, this posthegemonic fissure outlives the crumbling hegemonic world of principial High Modernism and no ‘international movement’ can piece it back together again. We are all posthegemonic now, but only if one takes up this predicament seriously and candidly.